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ABSTRACT 
The introduction of new technologies force navies to adapt and the introduction of 
surface-to-surface anti-ship cruise missiles from a large number of small coastal 
combatants created vulnerability in the Navy’s force structure of large, expensive, 
nonexpendable warships. To counter this threat, the adoption by the U.S. Navy of small, 
inexpensive, missile bearing vessels is recommended. Four alternative candidate vessels 
are evaluated using a mathematical simulation. The candidates are a Littoral Combat Ship 
with a surface warfare module, a National Security Cutter augmented with offensive and 
defensive weaponry, a “Sea Lance” inshore combat vessel, and a Combat Patrol Craft, a 
variant of the Cyclone class patrol craft augmented with offensive and defensive 
weaponry. Equal cost force structures for the four candidate vessels are developed, and 
then these forces are “fought” in simulated battles against a missile-firing opponent force 
of variable strength. Additional roles such as maritime interdiction and theater security 
cooperation are considered and the candidate vessels are qualitatively compared for their 
ability to perform in these missions. Sea Lance is demonstrated to be the most effective 
and lowest cost candidate vessel. The driving force behind this is the large number of 
vessels the equal-cost Sea Lance squadron makes possible by its low procurement and 
operating costs, a result predicted by Lanchester and Hughes because in naval combat, 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Throughout history, the introduction of new tactics and technology has forced 
navies to adapt or suffer the consequences. A handful of technologies have required a 
paradigm shift in force structure. One was the advent of aircraft before World War II, 
which pushed naval force structures to be centered on the aircraft carrier instead of the 
battleship. Another such technology is the surface-to-surface anti-ship missile, 
particularly when carried aboard small, inexpensive vessels operating close to shore. 
Against a force of such vessels, a blue water navy of all big, expensive ships is very 
vulnerable. In addition to this new threat, evolving needs in security patrol, theater 
security cooperation, maritime interdiction, and other operations require that a navy adapt 
by procuring its own small, inexpensive, missile bearing craft, as many nations have 
done. 
The current U.S. Navy force can be characterized as an all big ship fleet designed 
for blue water and force projection operations against opponents such as the former 
Soviet Union. Recent developments have suggested that operations against smaller navies 
composed of small, inexpensive, missile bearing vessels are far more likely, such as a 
conflict against Iran, North Korea, or China. The Navy’s current inventory of relatively 
small numbers of large, expensive ships is not well equipped to confront such threats. 
Because of this, the Navy may not be willing or able to put these ships at risk because 
their loss would be unacceptable. 
The thesis postulates that the Navy must identify and adopt a small, inexpensive, 
missile-bearing vessel that can be exposed to combat risks without posing unnecessary 
risk to the big navy force structure. This study compares four candidate vessels to fill this 
role: a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) with an adapted surface combat module, a National 
Security Cutter (NSC) outfitted with additional offensive and defensive weaponry, a “Sea 
Lance” near shore combat vessel designed by the faculty and students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, and a Combat Patrol Craft (PC), which is an adaptation of the 
Cyclone class PC with added offensive and defensive weaponry. 
 xiv
Utilizing the Salvo Model developed by Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (Retired) 
of the Naval Post Graduate School, the four candidate vessels were compared in a 
mathematical simulation of combat scenarios. In a base case scenario against a force of 
up to forty Chinese Type 022 Houbei coastal missile craft, the Sea Lance is demonstrated 
to be the most effective. Although the PC is the least expensive alternative, it is 
demonstrated to be wholly ineffective, making Sea Lance the least expensive, most 
attractive viable candidate. An additional case is considered in which defenses are 
imperfect, introducing the concept of leakers, missiles which penetrate defenses. The Sea 
Lance again is the most effective, least expensive alternative. In both cases, NSC is 
second to Sea Lance, followed by LCS and finally by the PC. The thesis also looks at 
additional factors, such as accounting for imperfections in scouting on either side, and the 
inclusion or exclusion of chaff and decoys. No variation changes the cost-effective 
choice. Doubling the staying power of the significantly larger LCS and NSC also does 
not alter the outcome. In every case Sea Lance is demonstrated to be the best choice. The 
driving force behind this is the large number of vessels the equal-cost Sea Lance 
squadron makes possible by its low procurement and operating cost, a result predicted by 
Lanchester and Hughes because in naval combat, numerical superiority is the single most 
important factor in determining the outcome of a battle. 
In addition to the missile combat scenarios, non-combat roles such as maritime 
interdiction, theater security cooperation, and homeland security, impose taxing roles on 
the current Navy structure. The addition of a large group of small, inexpensive vessels 
such as Sea Lance relieves the stress placed on the current Navy, freeing up the large 
ships to carry out the roles for which they were designed, which are power projection and 
blue water operations. Their small size and low cost makes Sea Lance much better suited 
for interactions with coastal navies and allows them to be supported by relatively modest 
sea or shore facilities in places at minimal risk to the Navy.  
The conclusion of this study is that a small vessel such as Sea Lance is the ideal 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND – WHY THE ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED 
On January 6, 2008, a column of three United States Navy warships was brought 
to a standstill in the Straight of Hormuz by a group of five marauding Iranian gunboats1. 
The Iranians did not fire on the Americans. They simply closed in close aboard, appeared 
to drop objects in the water, and verbally threatened the warships over the radio. The 
response of the Americans, or lack thereof, illustrates clearly the point this paper will 
demonstrate mathematically: the current U.S. Navy is highly capable, but its vessels are 
too large and too expensive to risk losing in combat, and such large, expensive vessels 
simply are not necessary for the missions they are often tasked to perform. It is necessary 
that smaller, combat worthy but less expensive vessels be added to the inventory to fill 
this role (as well as many other roles). We will sometimes refer to these small, lethal 
inshore combatants as “street fighters,” an apt name that is no longer in vogue. 
F.W. Lanchester first published his “Square Law” mathematical model for 
military combat in 1914.2 Although it was initially developed to help predict the impact 
of aircraft in World War I, it was found to be effective at modeling many types of 
combat, including ground combat and naval warfare. J.V. Chase developed a similar 
model for naval warfare in 1902,3 but his work was classified until 1972, and as a result 
Lanchester’s Square Law is a commonly accepted base model for modern combat. One 
common outcome that was found by both Lanchester and Chase was that the most 
dominant factor in predicting the outcome of a battle is the number of combatants, and 
this still tends to hold true today. Although terms are included for analyzing the 
effectiveness of individual combatants in even the most basic models, and these other 
factors certainly do play a role, the models are most sensitive to changes in the number of 
combatants involved in the battle.  
                                                 
1 Shanker and Knowlton, 2008. 
2 Lanchester, 1916. 
3 Chase, 1902. 
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Problems with the Lanchester model arose with the introduction of certain force 
multipliers and particularly the introduction of missiles into naval combat scenarios. 
When a single vessel carries a large number of missiles, the offensive combat potential of 
that single vessel rises dramatically. For the first time in naval combat the possibility of 
defensive countermeasures also enters into the equations. Thirdly, the previous models 
assume continuous rates of fire until a firepower kill is achieved, where as missiles tend 
to be fired in groups, or salvos, after which the effectiveness of the salvo is assessed prior 
to the firing of another salvo. To address these problems, Captain Wayne Hughes USN 
(Retired) of the Naval Postgraduate School developed the salvo equations as a modern 
extension of Lanchester’s work.4 In the salvo equations, the importance of the number of 
combatants becomes even greater and the equations reveal why. Hughes introduced terms 
that accounted for not only offensive effectiveness, but also defensive effectiveness and 
staying power (defined later). Prior to the introduction of missiles in naval combat, it was 
believed that the combat effectiveness of a naval vessel could be measured by the number 
of guns that it carried. For example, a ship of the line with three gun decks was 
considered equivalent to two ships of the line each with two gun decks. Hughes 
demonstrated that for modern salvo warfare at sea this is no longer the case. For example, 
to make a single vessel the equivalent of two adversaries, the single vessel must have 
double the offensive, the defensive, and the staying power of each of the two ships. 
Roughly speaking, to double the combat potential of a vessel, its overall capabilities must 
be increased by a factor of eight, often times at a comparable cost increase as well.  
The result is what we see in the United States Navy today; warships which cost 
well over a billion dollars apiece can be overwhelmed by a group of small, inexpensive, 
missile bearing vessels (street fighters), such as those possessed by potential adversary 
nations like Iran, North Korea, and China. This fact was illustrated in 1967 when an 
Israeli destroyer was sunk by a pair of much smaller, and seemingly less capable, 
Egyptian missile boats carrying only two missiles each. It is true that in such a conflict 
against a modern U.S. warship, the group of small vessels would likely be destroyed in 
the battle. But if the adversary nation trades fifty million dollars worth of small vessels 
                                                 
4 Hughes, 1995. 
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and a few dozen lives to succeed in sinking, or at least disabling or crippling, a two 
billion dollar United States warship, that is quite an effective return on its investment and 
a victory for its cause. Later this factor will be referred to and defined as favorable 
attrition. Recent experience in the Global War on Terror has clearly demonstrated that 
there is no shortage of individuals willing to go into combat against the United States 
knowing there is no hope of survival. This was demonstrated by the attack on the USS 
Cole on October 12, 2000.5 It is reasonable to assume that such small vessels crewed by 
such individuals would willingly sacrifice themselves if they believed the destruction of a 
large adversary could be achieved. This is a very dangerous prospect for the U.S. Navy’s 
current inventory of relatively few, very large, very expensive vessels. When the U.S. 
Army goes into combat with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, they do so 
expecting that not all of those tools will remain when the fighting is done. Their combat 
vehicles are expensive, but not so much so that they cannot afford to loose some of them 
in combat. Current navy planning does not reflect the reality that in modern missile 
combat, vessels will be lost, and the Navy does not possess any vessels which can be 
likened to the Army’s tanks and other vehicles which can be sent into combat expecting 
that some will not survive. 
B. POTENTIAL SCENARIOS 
There is no shortage of potential scenarios throughout the world which could lead 
to a confrontation between the United States and an adversary possessing relatively large 
numbers of street fighters. This adversary does not need to defeat the entire U.S. Navy, 
but only to defeat the vessels that we have in the area at the time. Our presence can range 
anywhere from a single Arleigh Burke class destroyer to an entire carrier strike group. 
The loss of an Arleigh Burke to a country which was previously thought to pose no real 
danger to the United States would certainly give the Navy, and indeed the entire country, 
cause for alarm and would require a pause to consider the implications and response, as it 
did in Yemen in 2000. A successful attack would also send a message to the world that 
the U.S. Navy no longer reigns supreme over the high seas.  
                                                 
5 Burns and Myers, 2000. 
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An obvious scenario which can be played out is the one mentioned in the 
beginning of this paper, a confrontation between Iran and the United States. Although the 
vessels encountered in January of 2008 were not carrying anti-ship missiles, they very 
easily could have been. In May of 2002 reports circulated that Iran had purchased a 
number of Chinese made C-14, or “China Cat,” missile attack boats, which are small, 
light, and fast, and carry up to eight short range anti-ship missiles.6 Vessels of this type 
have been observed in Iranian naval ports.7 To counter such vessels the U.S. has always 
counted on a range advantage, out scouting and defeating adversaries before entering into 
range of their weapons, but in the Persian Gulf, and particularly in the Strait of Hormuz, 
the range advantage is nullified. Whichever side fires first is most likely to win the 
exchange of fire. In the January 2008 case, if the Iranians had been carrying missiles and 
had fired them, even if the U.S. warships were able to see the missiles launch and fire 
their own missiles in return, the likelihood of the three U.S. vessels surviving a barrage of 
forty (five boats firing eight missiles each) incoming missiles is very small. The Iranian 
vessels may have all been destroyed as well, but trading five twenty-ton missile boats8 
for a Ticonderoga class cruiser or Arleigh Burke class destroyer gets at the heart of 
favorable attrition. If the U.S. mission in the Gulf could be accomplished by smaller, far 
less expensive vessels, the exchange outlined here might not be prevented, but it certainly 
levels the playing field, and reduces the exchange to either mutual attrition, or even 
favorable attrition on the side of the U.S. In any case, the lives of far fewer American 
sailors and the integrity of far less expensive military assets would be put in jeopardy. 
Another possible scenario can be found in the Sea of Japan. The U.S. routinely 
conducts naval exercises and port visits around Japan and South Korea. Recent activities 
in North Korea (attempts to obtain nuclear weapons, for example) have given rise to 
concerns about the possibility of a confrontation between the United States and North 
Korea. Also, since the cease fire was signed which ended the Korean War; there have 
been concerns about North Korea launching an offensive into South Korea, in which case 
                                                 
6 Pike, “C-14 China Cat Class Fast Attack Craft, Missile.” 
7 Gertz and Scarborough, “Iran’s Missile Boats.” 
8 Pike, “C-14 China Cat Class Fast Attack Craft, Missile.” 
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the U.S. Navy would undoubtedly support South Korea to the greatest extent possible. 
North Korea does possess vessels equipped with anti-ship missiles9, and in such a 
scenario would likely not hesitate to use them, which leads to a situation similar to the 
one laid out in the previous paragraph. 
There are any number of additional scenarios which can be played out in which 
the U.S. could become entangled in naval combat, including a conflict in the Caribbean 
between Venezuela and Columbia, or between the Greeks and Turks in the Aegean Sea, 
but it is not necessary to discuss all of them here. The primary scenario to be considered, 
and the core of the analysis to follow, is the possibility of a direct confrontation between 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the United States Navy. It is not a 
stretch to imagine an armed attempt by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to retake 
Taiwan, which they see as a rogue province, not an independent nation. The United 
States has pledged to support the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan in such a scenario, 
and would find itself facing a large naval force possessing a large number of small, high-
speed catamaran-type vessels, such as the Type 022 Houbei class, each carrying eight 
medium-range anti-ship missiles.10 In such a scenario, even a carrier battle group would 
likely find itself in jeopardy in proximity to the Taiwan Straight. The air cover provided 
by the carrier aircraft would likely be nullified by Chinese land-based aircraft, and 
airborne scouting effectiveness would be severely attenuated due to the conflict in the 
skies overhead. Therefore, U.S. Naval vessels would most likely be required to deal with 
the Chinese surface combatants ship to ship in a missile duel. This is a prospect that puts 
the current U.S. fleet at a grave disadvantage when facing off, for example, against forty 
or more Houbei class missile boats.11 
There is no quick and easy answer to the vulnerability of an all big ship navy 
described above, but there are solutions. This paper addresses the problem by proposing 
that an alternative to big ships be considered for construction, an alternative which the 
Navy can afford to expose to combat and risk. Four candidate vessels are compared in a 
                                                 
9 Pike, “Navy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).” 
10 Sinodefence.com, “Type 022 Houbei Class Fast Missile Attack Craft.”  
11 Sinodefence.com, “Surface Combatants.” 
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mathematical combat simulation which not only contrasts the attributes of the candidate 
vessels, but also “fights” groups of candidate vessels against an adversary force of 
varying size. The combination of subjective review of the attributes of the candidate 
vessels coupled with the analytical results of the combat simulation is used to determine 
which vessel is superior and therefore recommended for adoption by the Navy. 
 7
II. THE MODEL AND CANDIDATES 
A. DEFINITIONS 
To explain the mathematical model that was used to analyze the performance of 
various candidate naval platforms against an adversary force such as the Chinese Type 
022 Houbei, it is necessary to define some terms. For additional information on the terms 
and their mathematical definitions, see Hughes 1995 unless otherwise indicated. 
Favorable Attrition – the exchange of vessels of one’s own force for vessels of greater 
value or combat potential of an opposing force, such that the exchange favors 
one’s own force. 
Staying Power (a1, b1) – the number of missile hits required to put a unit out of action. 
Defensive Power (a3, b3) – the number of well-aimed incoming missiles destroyed by each 
unit’s defensive systems.  
Offensive Power (α, β) – the number of well-aimed missiles fired by each individual unit 
on average. 
Distraction Chaff (ρA, ρB) – missile countermeasure (chaff or decoy) used to draw off an 
otherwise good shot before it enters the targeting phase and before counter-fire. 
Ineffective chaff has an effectiveness value of 1; perfect chaff has an effectiveness 
value of 0 (because it acts to degrade the number of incoming ASCMs). 
Seduction Chaff (δA, δB) – missile countermeasure (chaff or decoy) used to draw off an 
otherwise good shot after it enters the targeting phase and after counter-fire. 
Ineffective chaff has an effectiveness value of 1; perfect chaff has an effectiveness 
value of 0 (because it acts to degrade the number of incoming ASCMs). 
Scouting Effectiveness (σA, σB) – diminishment of offensive power due to less than perfect 
targeting and distribution of fire, a number between zero and one. 
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Lethality – condition defined by Armstrong12 (low, moderate, or high) which 
characterizes the nature of a missile combat scenario based on the force ratios and 
the armaments of those forces. 
B. THE MODEL 
The salvo model13 used for this study deterministically calculates the number of 
surviving units following an exchange of missiles between two opposing forces. The 
terms in the model allow the opposing forces to be of varying size and allow the 
exploration of the effects of changing many different vessel characteristics. Not all of the 
characteristics incorporated into the salvo model were explored in the cost effectiveness 
comparison of the four candidates; the terms considered by this analysis are included in 
the definitions section above. The model assumes that each force is homogeneous, fire 
received by a force is distributed evenly across that force, and a missile salvo occurs 
within a discrete time step. For additional information on the salvo model and 
assumptions, see Appendix and Hughes, 1995. 
The basic salvo model equations determine the change in strength of a force (ΔA, 
ΔB) after an exchange of a single salvo, (see Equation 1). The change in strength of a 
candidate force is directly proportional to the opponent force’s initial force strength (B) 
and offensive power (β) minus the candidate force’s defensive power (a3) and force 
strength (A), and is inversely proportional to the candidate force’s staying power (a1). 















Naval combat simulations were performed using the salvo model programmed 
into Microsoft Excel (see Appendix for more information). All inputs may be varied, but 
the effects of those variables defined above were the only ones explored in this study. 
                                                 
12 Armstrong, 2003. 
13 Hughes, 1995. 
Equation 1 – Basic Salvo Model 
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The model determines the remaining forces from each side and displays them 
graphically. A separate graph was used for each of the four candidate vessels. The 
opposition force strength was used as the independent variable on the X-axis, varying 
from zero to forty, and the remaining vessels from both forces were the dependent 
variables displayed on the Y-axis. This allowed for a graphical determination of how a 
candidate force of a fixed number of vessels would fare in a combat scenario against a 
homogeneous opposition force varying in size from zero to forty. Forty was chosen 
because open sources suggest this is the approximate number of Houbei the PLAN 
intends to build.14 The model also allows for an instantaneous calculation in which a 
fixed number of both a candidate vessel and the opposition are input, and the model 
determines the remaining forces from both sides following a single salvo exchange. This 
allows for manipulation and exploration of specific regions which appear to be interesting 
on the graphical output, and determines the precise impact varying an individual variable 
has on the outcome of a combat scenario. 
Actual open source data for the vessels under consideration was used to the 
greatest extent possible to determine values of the model inputs, but in some cases 
approximation was required due to the lack of availability of data in the unclassified 
forum. Detailed descriptions of the characteristics used in the simulations will be 
discussed later in the vessel descriptions section. The Chinese Type 022 Houbei was used 
as the opponent in all simulations to provide a consistent basis of comparison, and 
because it is the most capable opponent likely to be encountered in the scenarios under 
consideration, that is to say, a littoral combat environment.  
C. VESSEL DESCRIPTIONS 
Each vessel considered is evaluated based on equal program procurement costs. 
We assume that a fixed budget of twenty billion dollars is available for the purchase of all 
units and support vessels (if required) of a candidate force. Squadron sizes and total 
number of vessels within a program are based on this budget, as well as the estimated 
                                                 
14 Sinodefence.com, “Type 022 Houbei Class Fast Missile Attack Craft.” 
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limitations of the envisioned support vessel; more information can be found in the 
candidate and support vessel descriptions below. 
1. Littoral Combat Ship 
As it was originally conceived, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)15 was to be a 
formidable inshore combatant which would likely have filled the role being explored by 
this study quite effectively. In his 2003 thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School, LCDR 
David Rudko, USNR, conceived the LCS as “an affordable, small, multi-mission ship 
capable of independent, interdependent and integrated operations inside the littorals.”16 
At three thousand tons and four hundred feet long, the LCS is no longer small, nor is it 
particularly affordable with a price tag of about five hundred million dollars, once the 
cost of the mission module is included. It is, however, still expected to be a highly 
capable warship, and therefore is being considered by this study. The surface combat 
module considered for this study is assumed to incorporate around eight medium range 
surface-to-surface, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), an Evolved Surface-to-Surface 
Missile (ESSM) pack of multi-purpose short range missiles, Close in Weapons System 
(CIWS), thirty millimeter gun system, and both distraction and seduction chaff or other 
decoys. It is understood that the LCS surface warfare mission module is currently being 
designed to utilize the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch-System (NLOS-LS), but due to the 
limited range of NLOS-LS (forty to sixty kilometers)17 compared to the YJ-83 missiles 
(one hundred twenty kilometers)18 carried by the opponent vessel, this study assumes that 
the surface warfare mission module is equipped with about eight longer range ASCMs. It 
is assigned a top speed of forty-five knots and combat crew of seventy-five. Although its 
range is expected to be forty-five hundred miles when cruising at low speeds, a range 
limitation of fifteen hundred miles when sprinting at tactical speeds for combat 
operations in addition to the requirement that additional mission modules be carried in 
                                                 
15 Pike, “Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).” 
16 Rudko, 2003. 
17 Pike, “Non-Line-Of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS).” 
18 SinoDefence.com, “C-802 / YJ-83 Anti-Ship Missile.” 
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theater will require the presence of a nearby support vessel or facility for replenishment 
of fuel and for the storage and change out of mission modules.  
 
Figure 1.   Photo – Littoral Combat Ship (Courtesy of Lockheed Martin) 
Based on these characteristics, the LCS was given an offensive power of six (this 
assumes that seventy-five percent of missiles available will be “good shots”) and a 
staying power of one. Based on its considerable size, a staying power of two was 
explored in the analysis, but historically a vessel of three thousand tons will have a 
staying power closer to one19 and so one is used for the base case. The defensive power 
was set at twelve, the highest of any vessel considered, ten for the ESSM (assuming that a 
significant portion of the missiles carried will be configured for anti-air defense, more 
than one missile may be required to defeat each incoming ASCM, and greater than ten 
incoming targets will overwhelm either the missile launcher or targeting system), one for 
the CIWS, and one for maneuverability given a tactical speed of forty-five knots which 
may allow it to evade one incoming missile. We assume that distraction and seduction 
chaff (or other decoys) would appear to an incoming missile with a radar signature very 
similar to the vessel being targeted. In the base case an incoming missile will have a fifty 
percent chance of targeting either the decoy, or targeting the vessel. Therefore, for having 
both distraction and seduction chaff launchers, the LCS is assumed to have fifty percent 
                                                 
19 Hughes, 2000. 
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effectiveness for distraction and seduction chaff, that is, an incoming missile will have a 
fifty percent chance of correctly targeting the LCS over the decoy before counter fire, and 
will also have a fifty percent chance of targeting the LCS following counter fire if the 
counter fire is ineffective.  
An LCS squadron is determined to comprise four LCS and a support vessel, based 
on the limitations of the support vessel. This results in a squadron procurement cost of 
three billion dollars (two billion for four LCS, one billion for the support vessel), and a 
manpower requirement of seven hundred (three hundred of which would be in harms way 
in combat). For a twenty billion dollar budget we can fund the procurement of just under 
seven squadrons, with a total of twenty-six LCS and a total manpower requirement of just 
over forty-three hundred. The values discussed in this section are summarized in Table 1. 
2. National Security Cutter 
Similar in size to the LCS is the National Security Cutter (NSC)20 originally 
designed for the U.S. Coast Guard. As a coast guard patrol vessel, it does not carry the 
armament required for consideration by this study as it was originally designed. 
According to Naval Ships Systems personnel at the Naval Postgraduate School, outfitting 
the NSC with an armament comparable to that described for the LCS is feasible. The 
organic NSC is expected to cost roughly four hundred million dollars and have a crew 
around one hundred twenty five. For the purposes of this study it is estimated to have a 
procurement cost of five hundred million dollars once offensive and defensive armament 
is incorporated, and have a crew of one hundred fifty, once personnel to operate the 
increased armament are included. The NSC is slightly longer than the LCS at four 
hundred eighteen feet and tips the scales at four thousand three hundred tons. The 
significant advantage the NSC gains over the LCS is in its range, estimated to be in 
excess of twelve thousand miles, relieving it of the requirement for a nearby support 
vessel or facility, except as required for replenishing ammunition. The NSC pays for this 
advantage with a disadvantage in speed, expected to top out at twenty eight knots. As 
stated previously, the armament of the adapted NSC is assumed to be comparable to the 
                                                 
20 Pike, “Maritime Security Cutter, Large (WMSL) / National Security Cutter (NSC).” 
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LCS, with eight medium range surface to surface anti-ship missiles, an ESSM pack of 
multi-purpose short range missiles, CIWS, thirty millimeter gun system, and distraction 
and seduction chaff or decoy launchers. 
 
Figure 2.   Photo – National Security Cutter (Courtesy of Northrop Grumman) 
As a result of the similarities between the LCS and NSC, the vessel characteristics 
used for analysis are very similar as well. Please see the LCS description for further 
explanations of the derivation of these values. The offensive power is set at six and 
staying power is set at one, as with the LCS. Slightly different from the LCS is the 
defensive power, set at eleven vice twelve due to the lower speed of the NSC. The 
distraction and seduction chaff/decoy are given an effectiveness of fifty percent, also as 
with the LCS. 
Due to the requirement of the support vessel being removed for the NSC and a 
unit cost similar to the LCS, the squadron size is found to be six vessels. Thus, the 
squadron costs for both vessel types are the same at three billion dollars, with a 
manpower requirement of nine hundred (all of whom will be in harms way in combat). 
The result is the same number of squadrons being created, just under seven, but unlike 
the LCS a total of forty vessels can be procured within the twenty billion dollar budget, 
with a total manpower requirement of six thousand. The values discussed in this section 
are summarized in Table 1. 
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3. Sea Lance 
In January, 2001, the Naval Postgraduate School published a technical report 
titled “Sea Lance – Littoral Warfare Small Combatant System.”21 The Sea Lance, as 
described in this report, is a logical progression of the Street Fighter concept and is 
similar to the LCS as it was originally conceived, and as LCDR Rudko defined it in his 
thesis (quoted above). The Sea Lance is small, fast, formidable, and relatively affordable. 
As conceived, it would be two hundred feet long, displace five hundred tons, and carry a 
total crew of twenty five, only twelve of whom would be onboard when combat 
operations are expected. Each vessel is estimated to have a procurement cost of one 
hundred million dollars (the cost was under eighty million dollars when the original study 
was performed, but for this study it is increased to account for inflation and additional 
costs), a top speed of fifty knots, and an operational range of twenty five hundred miles.22 
Thus, the Sea Lance is smaller, faster, and less expensive than LCS, but is more limited 
in range and armament. Due to its reduced size, it is only expected to carry four medium 
range ASCMs and will not have CIWS, but does carry the same ESSM pack and 
distraction and seduction chaff or decoy launchers as the LCS and NSC. 
Please see the LCS description for a more detailed explanation of how the 
following vessel characteristics were derived. Due to the number of ASCMs being 
reduced from eight to four, the Sea Lance is given an offensive power of three, and due to 
its diminutive size it is given a staying power of only one. For defensive power, it lacks 
the CIWS carried aboard the larger combatants, but due to its high speed capability and 
ESSM pack it is assigned a defensive power of eleven. Like the LCS and NSC, the 
distraction and seduction chaff/decoy launchers are given fifty percent effectiveness. 
                                                 
21 Byers et al., 2001. 
22 Pike, “Sea Lance.” 
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Figure 3.   Rendered Isometric – Sea Lance23 
Due to its limited range and number of missiles, Sea Lance will rely upon a 
support vessel for refueling and rearming. The support vessel will also house the portion 
of the crew that is not on board when combat is anticipated. It is assumed that the support 
vessel cannot effectively support more than twelve vessels of any size (see the support 
vessel description below for more information), so the squadron size is set at twelve, with 
a squadron procurement cost of two point two billion dollars, well under the squadron 
procurement cost of the LCS. The squadron manpower requirement is seven hundred, the 
same as LCS, but only one hundred forty four personnel are placed in harms way when 
the squadron goes into combat, compared to three hundred for LCS. The lower squadron 
cost allows for just over nine Sea Lance Squadrons to be procured within the twenty 
billion dollar budget, with a total of one hundred nine units (compared to twenty six 
LCS), and a total personnel requirement of just over six thousand three hundred. The 
values discussed in this section are summarized in Table 1. 
4. Combat Patrol Craft 
A variant of the Cyclone class Patrol Coastal craft (PC)24, like the NSC it is an 
existing hull not originally designed for this purpose which is being adapted for missile 
                                                 
23 Byers et al., 2001. 
24 Pike, “PC-1 Cyclone Class Patrol Coastal Craft.” 
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combat in this study. A very low cost alternative, the PC is expected to cost only sixty 
million dollars, with a length under one hundred eighty feet and displacement of only 
four hundred tons. The reduced cost is achieved by using an existing hull, a reduced top 
speed of thirty five knots (the current Cyclone class top speed)25, and a significantly 
reduced armament, which is also necessary due to its diminutive size. The Cyclone class 
has an approximate range of twenty five hundred miles and a crew of thirty, numbers 
which are maintained the same for this variant. The reduced armament allows for only 
two medium range surface to surface anti-ship missiles and one set of chaff/decoy 
launchers, in this case seduction chaff. Seduction chaff was chosen vice distraction chaff 
because it stands to reason that if only one type of chaff can be carried, and in limited 
quantity, a vessel will want to be sure that the incoming missile is in fact targeting that 
vessel before utilizing countermeasures. Distraction chaff is used before the missile 
acquires the target. Using seduction chaff allows the vessel the chance to evade without 
countermeasures before target acquisition occurs, then use countermeasures if the missile 
still manages to acquire the vessel. Unlike the other vessels above, our combat PC does 
not have the ESSM launcher, CIWS, or distraction chaff, and due to its limited range and 
habitability would require the support vessel. 
Due to its lack of defensive systems, the PC is assigned a defensive power of one, 
achieved through the assumption that its top speed of thirty-five knots can effectively 
defend against one incoming missile through evasion. Due to its size, its staying power is 
also one, and its offensive power is two. The other candidate vessels were charged a 
penalty of twenty-five percent to account for missiles launched that were not “good 
shots.” Because the PC only carries two missiles, as outlined here, it is given credit for 
both being good shots to make it more competitive with the other candidate vessels. As 
with the other vessels, the seduction chaff (or other decoys) is assumed to have an 
effectiveness of fifty percent.  
                                                 
25 U.S. Navy, “Patrol Coastal Craft – PC.” 
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Figure 4.   Photo – PC1 Cyclone (Courtesy of GlobalSecurity.org) 
Due to the larger crew and limitations on crew support capability of the support 
vessel, the squadron size for the PC is ten, with a procurement cost of one point six 
billion, barely half the procurement cost of the LCS squadron, and with a manpower 
requirement of seven hundred (three hundred of whom are in harms way during combat 
operations). This reduced cost allows for the procurement of twelve and a half squadrons, 
greater than all the others, with a total of one hundred twenty five units, and a total 
manpower requirement of over eighty five hundred, the largest total of any vessel type. 
The values for the PC are also summarized in Table 1. 
5. Support Vessel 
For the purpose of this study, the support vessel is envisioned to be a simplified 
variant of the San Antonio class LPD. The advantages of using this concept is that it 
utilizes an existing hull with air support capability (for the inclusion of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles, or UAVs, to improve scouting and helicopters for personnel recovery) and is 
already designed to support a large number of personnel in addition to the organic crew 
as well as interface with smaller seaborne vessels. This is particularly advantageous to the 
Sea Lance. With its small draft and size, it is even conceivable that the Sea Lance could 
dock with the support vessel inside the well deck, where replenishment, crew rotation, 
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and maintenance could be accomplished in a relatively sheltered environment. Loosely 
based on the vessel characteristics of the San Antonio class, it is estimated to have a 
procurement cost of roughly one billion dollars and an organic crew of four hundred. 26 
The San Antonio class is expected to cost more than this, but the support mission 
envisioned by this study requires fewer capabilities than a standard San Antonio class, 
which should allow the support vessel to be produced at a lower cost. Other 
characteristics, such as range, armament, displacement, and speed are not important for 
this study; it is sufficient to assume that it can be in the area of operation within reach its 
dependent vessels.  
 
Figure 5.   Photo – LPD 17 (Courtesy of flickr.com) 
The following limits are placed on the support vessel for squadron sizing 
purposes: it is assumed to have a maximum support capability of twelve vessels, three 
hundred crew members, or twelve thousand tons of combined displacement of dependent 
vessels, whichever limit is reached first. The vessel number limit is set due to limitations 
on the support vessel’s ability to rotate through servicing its dependent vessels. The crew 
limit is set based on providing relatively comfortable long term berthing onboard the 
LPD in excess of the organic crew, giving consideration for additional personnel required 
                                                 
26 Pike, “LPD-17 San Antonio Class (Formerly LX Class).” 
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for maintenance, crew rotation (berthing for two full crews for each dependent vessel 
may be needed if frequent rotations are required), and other specialties in addition to 
supporting the dependent vessel crews. The displacement limit is set based on the 
assumption that larger vessels use more fuel and larger crews require more stores, 
therefore taxing the replenishment capabilities of the support vessel if too many or too 
large dependent vessels are assigned. In the case of LCS the tonnage limit is reached first, 
in the case of PC the crew limit is reached first, and in the case of Sea Lance the vessel 
number limit is reached first.  
6. Chinese Type 022 Houbei 
The opposition force for this study is comprised of varying numbers of the 
Chinese Type 022 Houbei Missile Fast Attack Craft. This particular vessel was chosen 
due to the primary scenario being set in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, the Houbei is the 
most capable missile combatant possessed by any potential adversary in the envisioned 
scenarios. As a result, the conclusions drawn from analysis against the Type 022 can be 
readily applied to virtually any other theater with any other opposition force. 
The Houbei is smaller than the other vessels being considered, measuring only 
one hundred forty feet long, drawing two hundred fifty tons, and with a crew of twelve.27 
What it lacks in size it makes up for in performance. It is estimated to have a top speed in 
excess of forty knots, and though it may be limited in range, even a range of only one 
thousand miles is more than sufficient to carry out the mission of sea denial in the Taiwan 
Strait while being supported from land bases in mainland China. The Houbei’s offensive 
capability is formidable, carrying eight YJ-83 type medium range surface-to-surface, 
anti-ship missiles. Its defenses are less considerable, as it does not appear to carry any 
anti-air missile defense system, but rather depends upon a close in weapon system and 
either seduction or distraction chaff/decoy launchers (seduction chaff assumed for the 
purpose of this study). The procurement cost of the Houbei is unknown; open sources 
indicate that China is planning to build in excess of forty vessels.28 
                                                 
27 SinoDefense.com, “Type 022 Houbei Class Missile Fast Attack Craft.” 
28 SinoDefense.com, “Type 022 Houbei Class Missile Fast Attack Craft.” 
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Figure 6.   Photo – Chinese Type 022 Houbei (Courtesy of SinoDefence.com) 
For its speed and rapid fire gun defense, the Houbei is given a defensive power of 
two, and due to its size it is given a staying power of one. Its offensive power, diminished 
as with the other vessels by the assumption that not all shots are good shots, is set at six. 
Also as with the other vessels in this study, the seduction chaff launchers are estimated to 
have an effectiveness of fifty percent. As with the PC, seduction chaff was chosen in lieu 
of distraction chaff for the reasons stated in the PC description. The characteristics 
assigned to the Houbei for this study are not as important as those assigned to the other 
vessels. It appears that small changes to these characteristics would not significantly 
impact the overall outcome of the study, as it would affect each U.S. candidate force 
proportionally when combat modeling is conducted. The Houbei is simply used as a 
consistent adversary for comparisons. The values discussed in this section are 
summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Summary of Vessel Characteristics and Model Inputs 
Vessel Characteristics LCS NSC 
Sea 
Lance PC  
Type 022 
Houbei 
Length 400 418 200 179   140 
Displacement 3000 4300 500 400   250 
Crew 75 150 25 30   12 
Combat Crew 75 150 12 30   12 
Unit Cost ($M) 500 500 100 60     
Sprint Range 1500   1000       
Cruise Range 4500 12000 2500 2500     
Top Speed 45 28 50 35   40 
# ASCMs 8 8 4 2   8 
       





30mm 25mm   CIWS*
Distraction Chaff Yes Yes Yes No   No 
Seduction Chaff Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
Support Vessel Yes No Yes Yes   Port 
       
Model Inputs       
Staying Power (a1) 1 1 1 1   1 
Defensive Power (a3) 12 11 11 1   2 
Offensive Power (α) 6 6 3 2   6 
Scouting Effectiveness (σA) 1 1 1 1   1 
Seduction Chaff (a4) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5   0.5 
Distraction Chaff (ρA) 0.5 0.5 0.5 1   1 
       
Sqdn Size 4 6 12 10   
Sqdn Cost ($M) 3000 3000 2200 1600   
Sqdn Manpower 700 900 700 700   
# Sqdns 6.67 6.67 9.09 12.50   
Program Manpower 4350 6000 6325 8550   
Max Number 26 40 109 125   
Combat Cost Risk ($M) 2000 3000 1200 600   
Combat Crew Risk 300 900 144 300   
* The CIWS abbreviation is typically used to describe a specific U.S. Close In Weapons System; in 
this case it is describing an equivalent rapid fire hard kill defensive weapons system. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. BASE CASE 
The paragraphs that follow are a discussion of how each of the candidate vessels 
performed in the previously described model in a very basic scenario. A squadron of 
candidate vessels is “fought” against a small squadron of up to ten opponent vessels 
(Chinese Type 022 Houbei), and then fought against a variable force of up to forty 
opponent vessels. If the squadron of candidate vessels does not survive the squadron 
engagement, the force engagement is omitted. Following the discussion of all the 
candidates’ performance is a summary comparison of their overall performance in the 
simulations. In each case, the two forces expend all missiles in a single salvo, with 
outcomes that may range from both forces being completely annihilated, to neither force 
taking any casualties. Whichever force emerges from this exchange with a lower loss rate 
will be considered victorious. The base case does not account for factors such as leakers 
(incoming missiles that slip through otherwise perfect defenses) which would impact the 
attrition rate of the combatants, and does not account for scouting effectiveness as it is 
assumed in this case that both forces are within detection and engagement range of each 
other. These factors will be explored later insofar as how they impact the selection of the 
“best” candidate vessel. Also assumed is even distribution of fire, which may not be a 
realistic assumption, but should impact each candidate’s performance proportionally. 
1. Littoral Combat Ship  
In combat against the opponent squadron, the LCS is clearly superior (see Figure 
7). When given equal numbers of vessels, the LCS eliminates all of its opponents without 
taking any casualties. Even when outnumbered two to one, the LCS also does not take 
any casualties, and reduces the opponent force by half. Although both the LCS and the 
Houbei carry the same number of ASCMs (eight), this off-balanced result in favor of the 
LCS can be attributed predominantly to the ESSM system, which gives the LCS a large 
advantage in defensive power. Additional defensive hard and soft kill systems do impact 
the outcome on both sides, but the impact of these systems is relatively small compared 
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to the impact of the ESSM system. Once all ASCMs are expended, one or both forces 
would likely withdraw to rearm, or the battle would be decided by short range weaponry. 
In this case the LCS would also have the advantage, as it is equipped with short range 
surface warfare weapons systems such as thirty millimeter guns and ESSM. Any missiles 
in the ESSM system not utilized in anti-air defense can be reconfigured for short range 
surface warfare applications. The Houbei, by comparison, is armed only with a Close In 




Figure 7.   LCS Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Squadron Sized Force 
As might be expected, in the large scale engagement (ranging up to forty 
opponents, see Figure 8), the LCS squadron is eventually overwhelmed by both the 
combined defensive power of the opponent force, and also by the combined offensive 
force. It can be argued that four against forty is not a fair engagement, but all candidates 
will be subjected to the same scenario and the outcomes will be discussed for comparison 
purposes. Four significant break points in the scenario are worth noting. The first is when 
the opponent force reaches six vessels, at which point the opponent force is no longer 
completely destroyed. The second is when the opponent force reaches twelve vessels, and 
their combined defensive power is sufficient that incoming missiles are no longer able to 
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penetrate (as stated previously, this assumes even distribution of fire and no leakers). The 
result is a stalemate, in which neither side achieves any hits against the other. In the 
discussion of lethality conditions, this outcome demonstrates that this scenario is 
moderately lethal.29 The third break point is when the opponent force reaches sixteen, 
after which the opponent begins to score hits on and attrite the LCS force. It is worth 
pointing out that at this point the LCS force is outnumbered four to one, before taking 
casualties. After this point, as the opponent force increases, the LCS squadron takes 
additional casualties until the force is completely eliminated when the opponent force 
reaches nineteen vessels (the fourth break point). At this point the opponent is taking no 
losses, and the U.S. losses could potentially reach two billion dollars in vessel 
procurement costs and three hundred lives (if vessels are sunk with all hands vice 
firepower kill with survivors). Of note, additional calculations showed that to completely 
destroy an opponent force of forty Houbei, a force of twenty-seven LCS would be 
required (procurement cost for twenty-seven LCS and the appropriate number of support 
vessels is over twenty billion dollars).  
 
Figure 8.   LCS Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Fleet Sized Force 
                                                 
29 Armstrong, 2003. 
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2. National Security Cutter 
Due to the similarities between the offensive and defensive armaments carried by 
the LCS and the NSC, it is not surprising that the NSC achieved a similar performance to 
that of the LCS (Figure 9). The results were similar, but in this case the NSC was the 
superior performer. Because the NSC does not require the presence of a support vessel in 
theater, its squadron size is fifty percent larger, therefore bringing fifty percent more 
missiles to the fight. As an expected result, the opponent has to bring fifty percent more 
vessels, or nine, to the fight, before reaching the point where any of his force survives the 
exchange (the first break point). This leaves the NSC with far fewer opponent vessels to 
deal with in short range combat after the missile exchange in which all missiles are 
expended, giving it an advantage over LCS, particularly when considering the numerical 
superiority of the NSC force. However, the sprint speed of the LCS might allow it to run 
down and destroy a withdrawing opponent, while the NSC would likely find itself 
lagging behind due to its slower speed, making the initial missile exchange the only 
opportunity the NSC squadron would get to engage the enemy. As with the LCS, the 
performance advantage over the opponent force is predominantly attributed to the 
performance of the ESSM system.  
 
Figure 9.   NSC Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Squadron Sized Force 
 27
 
Figure 10.   NSC Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Fleet Sized Force 
In the large scale engagement scenario, the NSC again resulted in a performance 
very similar to but superior to the LCS (Figure 10). The results are nearly identical, but 
with different break points. The first break point was identified above at nine Houbei. 
The second break point occurs when the opponent force reaches eighteen, at which point 
a stalemate is achieved because neither force can penetrate the other’s defenses, again 
exhibiting the behavior of moderate lethality30. As a comparison note, the LCS started 
taking casualties after the opponent force reached sixteen. The NSC squadron does not 
start taking casualties until the third break point, when the opponent force is greater than 
twenty-two. The fourth break point, when the NSC squadron is put completely out of 
action, does not occur until the opponent force reaches twenty-six. While this outcome is 
superior to the outcome achieved by the LCS, it should be noted that the complete loss of 
an NSC squadron could result in U.S. losses of as much as three billion dollars in vessel 
procurement costs and nine hundred lives (if vessels are sunk with all hands vice 
firepower kill with survivors). This is a significantly larger loss than the loss of an LCS 
squadron, but up to the second break point the opponent force would take significantly 
                                                 
30 Armstrong, 2003. 
 28
greater losses as well, demonstrating the basic axiom that greater risk brings greater 
reward. As with LCS, to completely eliminate an opponent force of forty Houbei, a force 
of twenty-seven NSC would be required, the procurement cost for twenty-seven NSC 
being over thirteen billion dollars. 
3. Sea Lance 
For the Sea Lance, the squadron size engagement resulted in exactly the same 
result as for the NSC (Figure 11); the opponent force is completely destroyed until it 
reaches ten vessels, at which point two vessels survive (the first break point at nine). This 
should be expected, as the Sea Lance carries half the number of missiles as the NSC, but 
the Sea Lance squadron has twice the number of vessels. Unlike the NSC, however, with 
its superior speed, the Sea Lance has the capability to chase down a withdrawing 
opponent (if necessary) and finish the fight in short range combat with the thirty-
millimeter gun and remaining ESSMs.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Sea Lance Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Squadron Sized Force 
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The large-scale force scenario results were different for Sea Lance than for the 
other two candidates already considered (Figure 18). The second break point occurs when 
the opponent force reaches nine vessels, and the number of survivors increases linearly as 
more vessels are added to the fight, like NSC. The third break point occurs when the 
opponent force reaches eighteen vessels, again like NSC, and a stalemate is achieved. 
The fourth break point, now unlike NSC, never occurs within the range being considered. 
As the opponent force grows, finally reaching forty vessels, the combined defensive 
power of Sea Lance squadron of twelve is still able to defeat the incoming salvo without 
taking any casualties. This is a low lethality condition31, because neither side is capable 
of penetrating the other’s defenses. This suggests that perhaps in this scenario a better 
balance between offensive and defensive power has been achieved than in the other 
cases. Additional calculations showed that the first casualties suffered by the Sea Lance 
squadron would not occur until the opponent force reached forty-five vessels. This result 
overturns the previously stated axiom that greater risk brings greater reward. The Sea 
Lance squadron only risks one point two billion dollars in vessel procurement costs and 
one hundred forty-four lives when going into combat, significantly lower than either of 
the other two vessels discussed, but it achieves greatly improved results. Additional 
calculations showed that to completely eliminate an opponent force of forty Houbei, a 
total of fifty-four Sea Lance would be required (procurement cost for fifty-four Sea 
Lance and appropriate number of support vessels is ten point four billion, the least 
expensive alternative thus far).  
                                                 
31 Armstrong, 2003. 
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Figure 12.   Sea Lance Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Fleet Sized Force 
4. Combatant Patrol Craft 
As might be expected in the case of the PC, the lack of offensive and defensive 
armament left it ill prepared for the mission of defeating even a small opponent force. A 
combatant PC squadron might be effective in the mission of deterrence, but not direct 
combat (Figure 13). Only when facing a single opponent was the PC squadron able to 
emerge without taking any casualties, due to the high lethality condition of this combat 
scenario (in which both forces are capable of annihilating each other in a single salvo).32 
In this scenario there was only one break point of interest, when the opponent squadron 
numbered five vessels against our ten. At this point, both forces were completely put out 
of action. For this case only the Fractional Exchange Ratio (FER) was included in Figure 
13. The FER is defined as the number of vessels in one force exchanged for an 
opponent’s vessels, is only defined for a region where both forces take losses, and is 
effective at illustrating the concept of favorable attrition (FER was excluded from the 
other force discussions because the stalemate regions in the middle of each scenario 
                                                 
32 Armstrong, 2003. 
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prevented the FER from ever being defined in those cases, as there was no point where 
both forces took losses). In the PC case the FER demonstrates the favorable attrition 
achieved by the PC squadron early on, trading a single PC for two Houbei, but it quickly 
drops to zero as the opponent force grows.  
 
 
Figure 13.   PC Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Squadron Sized Force 
The discussion of the full force combat scenario is omitted because the entire PC 
squadron is destroyed when the opponent force reaches just five vessels. Additional 
calculations showed that to eliminate a force of forty Houbei, the PC force would require 
eighty vessels, all of which would also be put out of action, at a potential loss of four 
point eight billion dollars in procurement costs and twenty-four hundred lives (if vessels 
are sunk with all hands vice firepower kill with survivors). Such a force would also 
require eight support vessels, for a total procurement cost of nearly thirteen billion 
dollars, less expensive to replace than the LCS or NSC, but far more costly in losses than 
any of the other alternatives, making the PC a non-viable option. 
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5. Summary Comparison of Basic Case 
A close examination of the discussion points and figures above is not required to 
determine that one candidate force outperformed the other three. The Combat PC is 
summarily eliminated in this case, as it took the most losses while inflicting the least 
amount of damage. The LCS and NSC achieved similar performance, however the NSC 
mathematically performed better due solely to the fact that an NSC squadron is composed 
of more vessels, and therefore more offensive and defensive missiles, making it more 
survivable and more potent offensively. The best performer was the Sea Lance, due 
largely to the higher number of vessels in the squadron as well as the lower cost and 
manpower requirements, which makes losses more acceptable when they must be 
accrued. To be fair to the larger LCS and NSC, the model was also run using staying 
power of two for both vessels, which improved both candidates’ performance, but did not 
alter the outcome of the analysis. Table 2 summarizes the results of this analysis. 
 
Table 2.   Summary of Analysis for Base Case Scenario 
 LCS NSC Sea Lance PC  
Performance Ranking 3 2 1 4  
Break Point 1 6 9 9 5  
Break Point 2 12 18 18 10  
Break Point 3 16 22 44 1  
Break Point 4 19 26 52 5  
Lethality Condition Moderate Moderate Low High  
      
Candidate requirements to eliminate 40 Houbei:    
 LCS NSC Sea Lance PC  
# Vessels Required 27 27 54 80  
# Vessels Lost 0 0 0 80  
Procurement Cost $20.5 Billion $13.5 Billion $10.4 Billion $12.8 Billion  
      
Notes:   
     All break points are defined by the number of vessels in the opponent Houbei force 
     Break Point 1 - Number above which the Houbei force is no longer completely eliminated 
     Break Point 2 - Number above which the Houbei force no longer takes any casualties 
     Break Point 3 - Number above which the candidate force will start taking casualties 
     Break Point 4 - Number at which the candidate force is completely eliminated 
     Procurement cost includes the appropriate number of support vessels 
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B. CONSIDERATION OF LEAKERS 
Following the basic case, the model and scenario were adapted to allow for the 
incorporation of “leakers,” or incoming ASCMs which are good shots and would 
otherwise be stopped by perfect defenses, but have some probability of penetrating those 
defenses because no defense is actually perfect. This adds more realism to the model, as 
historically missile defense systems have not been perfect. In previous cases of missile 
combat, the incidence of leakers has tended to have a bimodal distribution, either no 
leakers occur, or a large number of ASCMs hit their targets.33 To account for this in a 
way which is relatively easy to model and easy to understand, a fixed percentage of 
incoming missiles are assumed to leak through both candidate and opponent defenses, in 
this case twenty percent, which is close to the historical average leakage rate through 
missile defense systems, defined as the leakage factor (L). For both the candidate and 
opponent forces, a term was added which multiplies together the total number of a force’s 
vessels (A, B), the offensive power (α, β), and the introduced leakage factor, divided by 
the staying power, and then this value is added to the ΔA and ΔB terms (see Equations 2 
and 3). The effect is that some additional losses occur to both sides in every case, the 
value of which is linearly dependent on the total number of missiles carried by a 





















αΔ = Δ +
 
 
The impact on the outcome of the scenarios described above was surprising in 
some aspects, not surprising in others. A primary effect which was significant across all 
the models was the breaking of the stalemates. In all cases, the stalemate region in which 
neither force can penetrate the other’s defenses disappeared, leaving instead an open 
                                                 
33 Hughes, 2000. 
Equation 2 – Basic Salvo Model Equation 3 – Salvo Model Adaptation for 
Consideration of Leakers. 
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region where both forces can be completely put out of action, shifting the scenarios to 
high lethality combat.34 This is an expected result, since by definition the leakage term 
eliminates the perfect defense, and therefore casualties will be accrued by both sides in 
every exchange. An unanticipated but also logical result was that even in the cases where 
one force is greatly outmatched or outnumbered (i.e., PC versus Houbei Fleet), some 
casualties were inflicted on the opponent force regardless of its superiority, due again to 
the fact that the defenses are no longer able to perform in a perfect manner. It is logical to 
assume that an incoming missile will only be engaged by one or two vessels in a force, 
and if the particular vessel that engages is unsuccessful for any reason, then casualties 
will occur regardless of the overall force size. 
1. Littoral Combat Ship 
Due to the littoral combat ship having only four vessels in a squadron, it was 
perhaps impacted the most by the introduction of leakers. Since a single opponent vessel 
has an offensive power of six, assuming twenty percent leakage, the LCS squadron 
strength is reduced by thirty percent. The result is that the LCS squadron can be nearly 
eliminated by as few as three opponents (Figure 14). Alternatively, the LCS squadron can 
completely eliminate an opponent force of up to eight vessels. The next break point is 
when the opponent force strength reaches the point where only leakers are able to 
penetrate, at which point the LCS squadron inflicts five casualties on an opponent force 
of any size. 
 
 
                                                 




Figure 14.   LCS Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Force with Leakers 
2. National Security Cutter 
The impact on the NSC of the introduction of leakers was similar to the impact on 
the LCS, but less severe due to the larger number of vessels in the squadron. Like the 
LCS, the NSC squadron begins taking casualties with the introduction of a single 
opponent, but the NSC force is not completely eliminated until the opponent force 
strength is five (Figure 15). The NSC squadron is also able to completely eliminate an 
opponent force up to twelve vessels, an improvement over the eight achieved by the LCS 
squadron, and continues to eliminate seven vessels on an opponent force of any size once 
leakers are the only missiles penetrating the opponent defenses.  
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Figure 15.   NSC Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Force with Leakers 
3. Sea Lance 
The impact of leakers was substantial on the Sea Lance squadron. Previously, the 
Sea Lance squadron appeared completely invulnerable to enemy attack, because the large 
number of vessels and high defensive power of each vessel made the Sea Lance 
squadron’s defenses impenetrable unless the opponent force was extremely large. The 
introduction of the leakage term removes that invulnerability and allows the Sea Lance 
squadron to suffer attrition, but due to the large number of vessels in the squadron, it still 
survives longer than the LCS or the NSC, requiring an opponent force of ten vessels to 
completely wipe out the squadron (Figure 16). The Sea Lance squadron is also able to 
inflict more damage than LCS but equal to NSC, completely eliminating an opponent of 
up to twelve vessels, and continuing to eliminate seven vessels on an opponent force of 
any size. The similarity to the NSC is expected because the Sea Lance squadron carries 
the same total number of missiles as the NSC squadron, and the leakage rate against the 
opponent force is dependent on the total number of candidate squadron missiles, the 
leakage factor, and the staying power of the opponent, all of which are the same for the 
NSC and the Sea Lance.  
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Figure 16.   Sea Lance Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Force with Leakers 
4. Combat Patrol Craft 
One of the surprising outcomes of the introduction of leakers was how it impacted 
the performance of the PC squadron, as it actually improved the PC’s performance. In the 
basic case the PC squadron was put out of action by such a small number of opponent 
vessels and the opponent force was able to completely block all incoming missiles so 
early in the model that the PC squadron was only effective against a very small opponent 
force, and large casualties were expected. With the introduction of leakers, the combat 
PC squadron continues to take large casualties, but is only put out of action slightly 
sooner in the model, whereas because the PC squadron’s missiles achieve leaker hits as 
well, larger opponent forces are put out of action than in the basic case (Figure 17). The 
result is that in some respects the PC squadron outperforms the LCS. An opponent force 
of four vessels eliminates the PC squadron, where only three were required to eliminate 
the LCS squadron. Once the opponent squadron is large enough so that only leakers 
penetrate its defenses, the PC squadron achieves nearly the same number of hits as the 
LCS squadron, and the loss of a PC squadron represents substantially lower losses in 




Figure 17.   PC Squadron vs. Chinese Type 022 Force with Leakers 
5. Summary Comparison when Leakers are Considered 
The superior performance of the Sea Lance squadron due to its lower cost and 
numerical superiority is again reflected in this case, as it inflicts the most damage and the 
losses are stretched over the largest span in the model. The NSC again achieved similar 
but superior results to the LCS, due to the larger number of vessels in the squadron. The 
PC performed better than in the basic case, and also outperformed the LCS in some 
respects, placing the LCS squadron and PC squadron on par when leakers are introduced 
into the model. The poor performance of the LCS can be attributed to the simple fact that 
four vessels cannot absorb an attack that includes leakers. Once the squadron begins 
taking casualties, it is put out of action very quickly. The firepower advantage of the NSC 
offset its numerical inferiority when compared to the PC squadron, but the firepower 
advantage of the LCS was not enough to offset its numerical inferiority. As with the basic 
scenario, to be fair to the significantly larger LCS and NSC, the analysis was also 
performed using a staying power of two for these vessels. With the staying power of both 
vessels set at two, the LCS is still outperformed by the Sea Lance and NSC, but regains 
its position above the PC, with the squadron not being completely eliminated until seven 
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opponents are engaged. The NSC performance with staying power of two becomes equal 
to the Sea Lance squadron, because it carries the same number of offensive weapons, and 
then requires the same number of leaker hits to be destroyed, but at a much higher cost if 
the squadron is lost. Table 3 summarizes the results of the analysis with consideration for 
the effects of leakers. 
Table 3.   Summary of Analysis for Scenario Including Leakers 
 LCS NSC Sea Lance PC  
Performance Ranking 3 2 1 4  
Break Point 1 8 12 12 7  
Break Point 2 12 18 18 10  
Break Point 3 0 0 0 0  
Break Point 4 3 5 10 4  
Lethality Condition High High High High  
      
Candidate requirements to eliminate 40 Houbei:    
 LCS NSC Sea Lance PC  
# Vessels Required 19 19 38 57  
# Vessels Lost 19 19 38 57  
Procurement Cost $14.5 Billion $9.5 Billion $7.8 Billion $9.4 Billion  
      
Notes:       
     All break points are defined by the number of vessels in the opponent Houbei force 
     Break Point 1 - Number above which the Houbei force is no longer completely eliminated 
     Break Point 2 - Number above which the Houbei force no longer takes any casualties 
     Break Point 3 - Number above which the candidate force will start taking casualties 
     Break Point 4 - Number at which the candidate force is completely eliminated 
     Procurement cost includes the appropriate number of support vessels 
 
C. MODEL PERFORMANCE 
1. Strengths 
The greatest strength of the model used for this analysis is the enormous 
flexibility and ease with which it can be understood. The equations are straight forward 
and relatively intuitive, making the outcomes of the analysis equally straight forward and 
intuitive. The model provides a basis for comparison which numerically and graphically 
demonstrates how each candidate vessel force compares with the others when fought in 
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identical scenarios. The outcomes of the scenarios are also repeatable, because the model 
is deterministic, so there is no randomness in the results. The ability to explore how each 
factor impacts each candidate force and compare those impacts across the forces was 
instrumental in the performance of this study. 
2. Impact of Additional Variables 
The model is very consistent. When variables are changed which should effect all 
candidates proportionally (i.e., changing the opposition vessel characteristics) the 
outcome of the analysis and ranking does not change, which is a desirable result for the 
decision maker. To verify this, several factors of interest not previously introduced into 
the analysis were explored, including the removal of chaff from all vessels, the impact of 
scouting, and increasing staying power for the larger LCS and NSC. When chaff was 
removed from the model, the ranking of the candidates remained the same, but the gap 
between each vessel widened, making Sea Lance stand out farther ahead of the other 
candidates, followed by NSC, LSC, and PC.  
The impact of scouting effectiveness also did not alter the outcome of the 
analysis. Scouting effectiveness acts as a degradation factor. In the previous analysis, the 
scouting factor was set at one, implying perfect scouting on both sides. When the 
scouting effectiveness of the candidate forces were degraded, the candidates scored fewer 
hits but took the same number of casualties (because the number of hits against the 
candidates is dictated predominantly by their defensive power). When the scouting 
effectiveness of the opponent force was degraded, the candidate forces scored the same 
number of hits against the opponent force, but took fewer casualties. In both cases the 
overall ranking of the candidate vessels remained the same.  
Increasing the staying power of the LCS and NSC also does not alter the ranking 
order, because it only affects the region between when the first hit is scored against the 
candidates to when the last candidate is destroyed. It doubles the number of opponent 
vessels required to cross this region. If the candidates being compared were very close in 
comparison, this increase could impact the outcome, as it did in the case of the NSC and 
Sea Lance when leakers were being considered, bringing the NSC force on par with the 
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Sea Lance in performance. But in general, the performance of the candidate vessels were 
varied sufficiently that changing the staying power of the larger candidates did not alter 
the outcome. In both the basic model and the model with consideration for leakers, the 
ranking remains the same. 
3. Weaknesses 
The most significant weakness of the model is the artificiality presented by the 
lack of randomness. Historical battles have shown that combat is not deterministic, but 
stochastic,35 and the salvo model does not account for this. Ideally, factors such as the 
leakage rate should be modeled randomly, which can be accomplished with some 
additional work, but this was beyond the scope of this study and would likely not alter the 
ranking. An additional weakness of the model is that it only accounts for a single salvo in 
each scenario, when in reality a force would likely fire only a portion of their offensive 
missiles, wait to assess the results, and then fire an appropriate number of the remaining 
missiles to finish the job. This can be incorporated into the model by modeling the first 
exchange with a reduced offensive power to simulate a force withholding a portion of its 
missiles, determining the outcome, then repeating for the remaining missiles held by the 
remaining forces, but this cannot be easily accomplished in a way that allows the 
graphical demonstration of the effects of altering the size of an opponent force as was 
done here. 
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IV. EXPANSION OF ANALYSIS 
A. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS AND ENVIRONMENTS 
Up to this point the analysis performed in this study has examined only one 
scenario, missile combat in the Taiwan Strait against a force of Chinese Type 022 
Houbei, and determined the best candidate vessel for that scenario. This section will 
explore some of the other roles that a vessel designed for littoral combat might be 
expected to fill with a qualitative discussion of how well the candidate vessels might 
perform in those roles. Some of the alternative scenarios mentioned in the introduction 
will also be addressed with a determination of the impact of different scenarios on the 
vessel rankings established in the analysis.  
1. Theater Security Cooperation 
In 2008, the RAND Corporation released “Small Ships in Theater Security 
Cooperation” which examined the interactions between foreign navies which are 
potential partners in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and small vessels being 
considered for adoption by the U.S. Navy.36 The ultimate conclusion of the study was 
that additional research was required to determine many of the requirements and roles 
which would be performed by a small vessel both inside and outside the realm of TSC. It 
also stated that the PC-1 Cyclone class, while not an ideal choice, could fill the role if 
properly adapted and supported by a larger vessel. Prior to the release of the RAND 
study, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) released “Next-Generation Navy Green 
Water Craft” which addressed many of the same issues identified by the RAND study.37 
An interesting concept postulated by the CNA study and supported by real world 
examples is the “rule of two” which states “that a given vessel can operate effectively 
with a vessel from twice its size to half its size.”38  
                                                 
36 Button et al., 2000. 
37 Cox and Potashnik, 2007. 
38 Cox and Potashnik, 2007. 
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To perform effectively in theater security cooperation, a U.S. Navy vessel must be 
able to work well with partner nations, a concept which President George W. Bush refers 
to as the thousand ship navy. The CNA study tabulated vessels from numerous countries 
in different parts of the world, finding that in areas of the world such as the Gulf of 
Guinea, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, the average vessel used by national navies 
was roughly one hundred to one hundred fifty feet long, with speed capabilities up to fifty 
knots.39 By the rule of twos, to effectively work with the majority of vessels in these 
navies a U.S. Navy ship should not be greater in length than roughly two hundred feet. 
This eliminates the LCS (four hundred feet) and NSC (four hundred eighteen feet) as too 
large, leaving only the Sea Lance and PC. The RAND study also suggested that in TSC, 
having a larger number of small vessels was advantageous over a small number of large 
vessels due to the nature of the mission requiring force dispersion, even when considering 
the requirement for a support vessel, again edging out the LCS and NSC due to their high 
procurement cost making large numbers of vessels infeasible.  
Although the original Sea Lance design did not include a Rigid Hull Inflatable 
Boat (RHIB),40 the catamaran design could be easily adapted to include a launch and 
recovery system between the hulls, matching its capabilities to those of the PC in TSC. 
The added bonus of the Sea Lance is the top speed of fifty knots, which would allow it to 
keep up with all but the fastest of vessels possessed by other nations. The rapidly 
changing environments in which forward deployed vessels employed in TSC can expect 
to operate requires that a vessel be capable of multiple missions, because it is never 
known when it may be called into action. Once in a combat role, the previous analysis 
demonstrated that the PC is at a serious disadvantage, suggesting that the Sea Lance is the 
ideal choice. In addition, the shallow draft due to its catamaran design would allow it to 
enter into shallow mini-harbors and inlets where the PC would not be able to enter. 
                                                 
39 Cox and Potashnik, 2007. 
40 Byers et al, 2001. 
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2. Interdiction 
Interdiction operations are nothing new for the Navy, and are not expected to 
disappear from the Navy’s task list in the near future. Between the war on drugs in the 
Caribbean, economic sanctions against Iran, Homeland Security, anti-piracy in the 
Malacca Strait, etc, the requirement for the Navy to support the Coast Guard in 
interdiction operations, or perform its own interdiction operations, is continuing to 
increase. In the majority of cases, the size of the vessel performing an interdiction 
operation is not of particular importance, as an armed Navy vessel of virtually any size is 
intimidating enough to force a civilian vessel to heed to. What is important is that the 
intercepting vessel be capable of finding, and then catching the vessel of interest, a 
particular problem in the war on drugs, and when countering piracy. 
In the Caribbean, one popular tactic used by drug runners is the use of very fast 
vessels (known as go-fasts) which can outrun a standard Coast Guard patrol vessel, and 
would be able to outrun the NSC, and likely the PC as well. Sea Lance and LCS, 
however, would be much more capable of catching one of these fast vessels. Another 
problem currently faced in the Caribbean is the growing use of semi-submersible vessels, 
which are extremely difficult to locate. Because of this, to effectively search for these 
vessels a large number of interceptors would be required, which places Sea Lance ahead 
of LCS due to the large procurement cost of LCS. 
In general, when performing interdiction operations of any kind it is not necessary 
to employ large vessels. Most boarding operations are performed from a RHIB, the 
smallest of vessels employed by the Navy. It is far more useful to have a large number of 
vessels (carrying RHIBs) which are capable of operating independently or 
interconnected, intercepting a vessel and sending personnel aboard it, a role for which the 
Sea Lance and PC are both better suited than either the NSC or LCS. Given the smaller 
size and greater maneuverability of the Sea Lance and PC, they would also be more 
ideally suited to operations in the Persian Gulf, where numbers of vessels performing 
intercepts is particularly important because of the extremely large quantity of vessel 
traffic in the area.  
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3. Export to Partner Nations 
To work effectively with other nations, whether it is for theater security 
operations, interdiction operations, or assisting a partner nation in protecting itself against 
a potentially hostile neighbor (e.g. South Korea), it is important that the Navy possess a 
vessel which can work well with those nations’ existing forces as well as a vessel which 
can be exported to those countries. Because of their high cost, LCS and NSC are not well 
suited to this role. Because of its limited combat potential, the PC is also not very well 
suited to this role. The highly capable and flexible Sea Lance is a better option, as it is 
more affordable and its size fits the needs of smaller countries with small boat navies.  
It cannot be argued that the requirement for a support vessel might make the Sea 
Lance less attractive to other countries, because the majority of nations to which such a 
vessel might be exported are more interested in the security of their own shores rather 
than projecting power around the world. The vessels can be supported from local bases, 
eliminating the need for a support ship. Even in the Taiwan Strait scenario the support 
vessel requirement can be reconsidered, as a squadron of Sea Lance can draw the support 
they need from the Island of Taiwan. The much larger NSC and LCS are less well suited 
to entering many of the small ports and inlets, making support and forward deployment 
more difficult.  
B. SUMMARY 
For a century the U.S. Navy has been a blue water force, concentrating on large 
combat vessels capable of operating anywhere in the world. The environments in which 
the Navy is now being called upon to operate in, such as the Persian Gulf and Caribbean, 
do not favor the large vessels, but rather a large group of small vessels. For the widest 
flexibility, particularly where shore support is available (Persian Gulf, Caribbean, Sea of 
Japan, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, etc), large, long range vessels aren’t necessary, 
and instead may become more inviting targets, particularly when visiting foreign ports 
(i.e., USS Cole in Yemen). Whether for theater security cooperation, interdiction 
operations, export to other nations, homeland defense, or one of many other missions, the 
experts generally agree (RAND and CNA among others) that numbers and affordability 
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outweigh size and advanced weaponry. Hence, Sea Lance is preferable to both NSC and 
LCS, while its greater combat potential makes it preferable to the combat PC. 
C. ADDITIONAL STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the performance of this study, several areas were identified which would 
benefit from closer examination and additional study. The goal of this study was to 
compare and contrast the candidate vessels being considered. Factors which likely would 
not change the outcome of the comparison were not considered, or were handled 
qualitatively. It is not believed that such other factors would alter the outcome of this 
study, but are worth additional exploration (perhaps with simulation). 
1. Stochastic vs. Deterministic Modeling 
As stated in the weaknesses section above, the salvo model used for this study is 
deterministic; there is no randomness in the model. While this is beneficial for clear 
comparison, because the results of any change to the inputs will always be the same, it is 
not particularly realistic because of the randomness in any real world combat scenario. 
Introducing stochastic variables can add additional insights. In this study all candidates 
(except PC) had their missile inventory reduced by twenty five percent in the 
determination of their combat power. A random reduction factor within some fixed range 
to account for misfires, unexpected interference, and other unpredictable factors, could be 
enlightening. The leakage factor was fixed, where twenty percent of good shots were 
assumed to leak past defenses. This factor is also likely to be far more random in a real 
scenario. Scouting effectiveness due to weather effecting one side more than the other, 
chaff and decoy effectiveness due to unpredictable adverse or favorable surface 
conditions, many of the terms used in the salvo model can be subjected to randomness. 
For the purpose of this study fixed values were either determined or assumed, equivalent 
to the mean value expected to be found if a series of stochastic simulations were 
performed, but to completely determine the effect of randomness on the model and the 
candidate selection process, further study would be required. 
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2. Incorporation of Leakers 
Leakers, or incoming ASCMs which should be stopped by defensive systems but 
“leak” through due to imperfections in the defensive system, are incorporated into the 
model, but only in a very coarse manner. In this study, the effect of leakers is determined 
to be an addition term added to the change in force strength which is proportional to the 
combined offensive power of a squadron and inversely proportional to the combined 
staying power of the opposition squadron. Although it is useful in illustrating the effect 
leakers have for candidate comparison purposes, it is not necessarily the most accurate 
manner with which to incorporate leakers into the salvo model. Ideally, leakage terms 
should be incorporated into the primary salvo equations themselves, rather than simply 
adding an addition term. The determination of exactly how to modify the salvo equations 
to properly incorporate leakers was beyond the scope of this study, although there is no 
evidence that incorporating leakers in a different manner would alter the conclusions 
reached here.  
3. Additional Unexplored Variables 
Many of the variables included in the salvo model were used in the performance 
of this study, but several variables with the potential for significant impact were 
excluded, and therefore additional exploration of these variables might be beneficial. 
Scouting effectiveness was only explored insofar as how an advantage in scouting 
affected the outcome of the comparison results. No attempt was made to realistically 
estimate the impact of satellite imagery, UAVs, other aerial surveillance, or any other 
scouting method on scouting effectiveness. These factors were assumed away initially 
with the statement that an aerial battle could be expected to nullify scouting abilities. The 
impact of the seduction and distraction chaff and decoy was also not explored in detail, 
but was set at a fixed number for both sides. Further study to determine the actual 
effectiveness of chaff or decoys for vessels of varying size might alter the outcome of this 
study, although it can be reasonably expected that a smaller vessel with a smaller radar 
cross section would benefit more from chaff and decoys, and therefore would give an 
even greater advantage to the smaller candidates (i.e., Sea Lance). Seduction and 
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distraction chaff were also assumed to have the same effectiveness, which might not be 
realistic, and the choice of seduction chaff only for the Houbei and PC could be re-
evaluated if further examination of the impact of this variable is performed. Two other 
variables in the embellished salvo model, defender alertness and training effectiveness, 
were left out of this study entirely. It is not believed that these variables would impact the 
outcome of this study, as they would probably affect each of the candidate vessels in the 
same manner, but further study may be warranted. 
4. Additional Candidates 
The range of candidates considered by this study was limited to four, looking only 
at a handful of existing or proposed domestically produced vessels. As the U.S. Navy is 
primarily a big ship navy, the number of small vessels available for comparison is 
limited. However, a number of other countries are already producing formidable street 
fighter type vessels, such as the Swedish Visby Class Corvette41 and the Norwegian 
Skjold Class Missile Patrol Boat42. After an analysis similar to this one of some of the 
other vessels available internationally, the results could be compared to the results of this 
study to contrast domestically produced and internationally produced vessels, and would 
be a significant benefit and a logical progression of this analysis. 
5. Tactics 
An important consideration which was left out of this study was the incorporation 
of tactics, and how tactics impact the outcome of a combat scenario. Tactics are 
inherently difficult to model, and the focus of this study was on the analytical comparison 
of candidate vessels in an intuitive model. The large variation in the sizes of the combat 
forces being considered (i.e., four LCS in a squadron vice twelve Sea Lance in a 
squadron) and in the capabilities of the candidates (i.e., top speed of NSC is twenty eight 
knots vice top speed of Sea Lance is fifty knots) gives rise to questions of tactics which 
may be available to some candidates but not available to others. Exploration of tactics 
                                                 
41 SPG Media Limited, “Visby Class Corvettes, Sweden.” 
42 SPG Media Limited, “Skjold Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats, Norway.” 
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which are available, how they might impact the performance of a candidate in the 
scenarios being considered, and of particular importance how they might impact the 
ranking of candidates would be a beneficial extension to this study. It is expected that 
most tactics which might be considered would give the advantage to the faster and more 
numerous vessels, and as such it is reasonable to assume that the addition of tactics would 
not alter the overall conclusion that the Sea Lance is the top performer, but further 




The Navy’s current inventory of relatively few, large, expensive, vessels is very 
capable, particularly when considering efficient projection of power scenarios. This study 
has explored a critical weakness in this force structure, which is the vulnerability of big 
warships when conducting operations near shore against an opponent who possesses 
relatively large numbers of small, missile bearing vessels. Numerous historical examples 
have shown that the introduction of missiles into modern naval combat requires a 
balanced approach to ship design, balancing offensive power, defensive power, staying 
power, and force numbers.43 Without this balance, high lethality combat conditions can 
exist44 in which each side is able to completely eliminate the other with a single salvo. 
This gives rise to the realization that a small force of inexpensive vessels, in a missile 
combat scenario, can be victorious over a much larger and more expensive adversary 
vessel or group of vessels, achieving favorable attrition. 
Combat models introduced by Lanchester, Chase, and later Hughes, all 
demonstrate that in naval combat scenarios the number of vessels participating is the 
single most important factor in determining the outcome of a battle. With the introduction 
of missile combat and the salvo model, the number of participating vessels became even 
more important. To remain competitive in an evolving world in which small, 
inexpensive, missile bearing craft, or street fighters, reign supreme over the littoral 
waters, the Navy must develop and adopt its own small and inexpensive warships so that 
it can be exposed to the dangers of combat operations without representing too great a 
risk to the naval force structure. 
Four potential candidates were introduced for consideration to fill this role: the 
Littoral Combat Ship with surface warfare module (LCS), the National Security Cutter 
with the addition of offensive and defensive armament (NSC), the newly conceived and 
designed Sea Lance inshore combat vessel, and a “beefed up” Combat Patrol Craft (PC), 
                                                 
43 Hughes, 1995. 
44 Armstrong, 2003. 
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an adaptation of the Cyclone class patrol craft with additional offensive and defensive 
weapons. Of the four vessels described, only Sea Lance is specifically designed to fill the 
role being explored. The NSC was developed for the Coast Guard, and would require 
significant augmentation. The PC was designed for patrol, not missile combat, and for 
this study required significant adaptation. The surface warfare module for LCS is 
designed for combat against other surface ships, but the vessel itself is designed to be far 
more multi-purpose, and is too large and expensive, making it not as ideally suited to this 
role. While specifically designed to fill the role described here, Sea Lance is also a 
flexible platform capable of filling many other roles (such as patrol, interdiction, security, 
etc). With only minor adaptations, its moderate cost makes the procurement of large 
numbers of them more feasible than can be achieved with larger vessels, making a Sea 
Lance force even more effective in these roles than the alternatives. To be fair it should 
also be noted that in non-combat roles, such as patrol and security, even Sea Lance is 
more ship than is really needed. The Center for Naval Analyses introduced a concept of 
“Big Brother” and “Little Brother”45 for which Sea Lance would be well suited to fill the 
role of big brother, but an even smaller, lightly armed and far less expensive (less than 
ten million dollars apiece, for example) craft could perform many of the same functions 
so long as shore based support is readily available. Even given this consideration, Sea 
Lance is far better suited than the other candidates considered here. When considering 
frequency of operations, the Navy finds itself performing interdiction and patrol 
operations far more often than missile combat, which means any vessel adopted by the 
Navy should be a strong performer in these areas, as Sea Lance has been demonstrated to 
be. 
The comparison of the four candidate vessels in the base case missile combat 
scenario demonstrated that the generally accepted axiom of greater risk brings greater 
rewards is not necessarily true. A squadron of Sea Lance costs significantly less than a 
squadron of either LCS or NSC yet outperformed both of those candidates, due largely to 
the large number of vessels in the Sea Lance squadron, which compounds the defensive 
power to make the squadron more survivable. The NSC outperformed the LCS due to the 
                                                 
45 Cox and Potashnik, 2007. 
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larger number of vessels, made possible by removing the requirement for a support 
vessel. The combat PC squadron is cheaper than the other squadrons, and might be well 
suited to performing the alternative roles described above, but is not suited to missile 
combat and would be quickly defeated with heavy casualties. To perform the same 
mission of eliminating a force of many Houbei in order to establish Sea Control in a 
region, the Sea Lance squadron is the least expensive alternative, and exposes the fewest 
number of personnel to combat risks. 
When the concept of leakers is introduced into the model (leakers being good 
shots which penetrate otherwise perfect defenses due to the fact that real defenses aren’t 
perfect) the overall outcome remains the same. The Sea Lance squadron continues to 
outperform the LCS and NSC because of the number of vessels in the squadron. It 
achieves the same number of hits against the opponent as the NSC squadron (because the 
Sea Lance and NSC squadrons carry the same number of missiles), but survives assaults 
by larger opponent forces. The surprising result was the improvement in performance of 
the combat PC when leakers were introduced due to the ability to absorb more hits 
because of the size of the PC squadron. It still lags behind the other candidates, but is 
raised on par with the LCS because the small number of vessels in the LCS squadron 
simply cannot absorb any hits without being significantly depleted, allowing it to be 
eliminated by very few opponents. As with the base case, to accomplish the same mission 
of eliminating a force of up to forty Houbei, the Sea Lance squadron is the least 
expensive alternative. More importantly in this case than in the base case because the 
candidate force is completely eliminated for all candidates, the Sea Lance squadron 
exposes the fewest number of personnel to combat by a factor of more than three when 
compared to the next closest competitor (LCS). 
The exploration of other factors did not change the vessel ranking. The exclusion 
of chaff from all candidates reduced each of their performance proportionally. The 
consideration of scouting effectiveness impacted all of the candidates, whether the 
scouting advantage was given to the opponent, or to the candidates. To give further 
consideration to the size of LCS and NSC when compared to Sea Lance and PC, the 
staying power of these two candidates was increased from one to two (historical data 
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indicating that their staying power should be just over one).46 Despite this advantage, the 
Sea Lance squadron still remained ranked as the top performing candidate, though the 
NSC squadron partially closed the gap, with LCS still trailing behind. 
Each aspect approached by this study compared the four candidates either 
quantitatively or qualitatively, and in each comparison the result was the same. When 
considering a vessel for adoption that is capable of performing in multiple roles and 
environments in the littorals, as well as fighting in missile combat against a potential 
adversary possessing small missile bearing combatants, the best performing and least 
expensive alternative is a force of small, relatively inexpensive, missile bearing vessels 
such as Sea Lance. Because of their lower cost, they can be procured in much greater 
numbers, and because of their small size they gain a great deal of flexibility for inshore 
operations as well as their ability to be supported by bases ashore or by support vessels. 
In addition, the low cost and small crews associated with these small vessels generate the 
least amount of risk when combat occurs. 
                                                 
46 Hughes, 2000. 
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APPENDIX – MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
 The model used for simulations in this study was developed using Microsoft 
Excel using adaptations of the equations found in the Salvo Model.47 This appendix is a 
description of how the model was created to allow the reader to recreate this work to 
more easily facilitate further study of the conclusions reached herein. A screen capture of 
the working page of the model with sample inputs is included as Figure 18. Variables 
which are available for manipulation are indicated in blue. 
 The basic, unembellished salvo model was created first, by simply creating a cell 
for each of the A force and B force variables (A, a1, a3, α and B, b1, b3, β). The basic 
definitions of these terms are annotated in Figure 18. Scroll bars were used to control the 
values of these variables and ensure that only integer values could be used, but are not 
necessary. The equations from the basic salvo model (see equation 4) were then entered 
into separate cells to determine the change in each force level after a single salvo 
exchange (ΔA, ΔB) and the final force levels (Af, Bf), which are simply the change in 
force term (ΔA, ΔB) subtracted from the initial force level (A, B). In Figure 18 these 














 The salvo equation “embellishment” terms (labeled Additional Terms in Figure 
18) were added to allow for the exploration of the effects of additional factors, such as 
seduction and distraction chaff and scouting effectiveness. Not all of the terms included 
in the model were explored in this study. For the sake of simplicity, the calculations were 
broken down in the same matter as in Hughes, 1995. It would be a relatively simple 
matter to combine calculations into fewer cells, but would have made the model less 
transparent and more difficult to diagnose if problems were encountered. The terms 
                                                 
47 Hughes, 1995. 
Equation 4 – Basic Salvo Model 
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altered by the embellishments are a3, α, b3, and β, the embellished forms being annotated 
as a3’, α’, b3’, and β’ under the Calculated Values heading in Figure 18. The Equations 
used to calculate these are included as Equations 5 and 6. The final values of the change 
in force levels (ΔA, ΔB) and final force levels (Af, Bf) were then recalculated and appear 
under the Embellished Values heading on Figure 18; the equations used are included as 
Equation 7. The basic definitions of the embellishment terms are annotated on Figure 18. 
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 The final calculation performed for the model, the non-graphical portion that is, 
was the determination of the Fractional Exchange Ratio. The equation used is included as 
Equation 8 and was programmed into separate cells. The calculation was performed 
twice, using both the basic force change terms and the embellished force change terms 





Δ= Δ  
 
 One additional block shows up on the model worksheet, which is the Lethality 
Condition.48 This was calculated using the equations developed by Armstrong to define 
the lethality conditions. A lookup table was created on a separate calculations page which 
used three “IF” statements to calculate a binomial for each of the three Lethality 
conditions, the binomial having a value of one for true and zero for false. Quasi-code for 
                                                 
48 Armstrong, 2003. 
Equation 5 – α and β Embellishments Equation 6 – a3 and b3 Embellishments 
Equation 7 – Salvo Equations Using Embellishment Terms 
Equation 8 – Fractional Exchange Ratio 
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the lookup table is included as Table 4. To list the lethality condition on the model 
worksheet, the VLOOKUP function was used, using the quasi-code: “=VLOOKUP(1, 
Lookup Table Range, 2, False)” which then displayed the lethality condition which 
corresponded to the row having a value of one indicating true. Note that the Medium 
Lethality condition is determined by checking whether Low or High lethality has been 
determined true. This was done to help prevent multiple conditions from indicating true 
(which should not happen unless an error has occurred) and because the conditions used 
for determining Medium Lethality are more complicated than Low or High (See 
Armstrong, 2003). 
Table 4.   Quasi-Code for Lookup Table for Lethality Condition 
Lethality Condition 
= IF (α / b3 <= a 3 / β, 1, 0)   Low 
= IF (above = 0, IF (below = 0, 1, 0), 0) Medium 
= IF (α / (b3 + b1) >= (a 3 + a1) / β, 1, 0)   High 
The next step in generating the model worksheet was the creation of the graph 
displayed in Figure 18, which was used as the basis for many of the figures which appear 
throughout this study. A separate worksheet was used to calculate all the values used in 
the generation of the graph. The first column was simply numbered from one to forty to 
represent the variable number of Houbei in the opposition force. The second column 
calculated ΔA for each row, using the embellished constants on the model worksheet 
page and the value in the first column of the same row for the B term. In the same 
manner, the third column calculated Af, the fourth column ΔB, the fifth column Bf, and 
the sixth column FER using Equation 7 above. Note that the value of A was fixed, and 
obtained from the model worksheet page. Quasi-code for these calculations is included in 
Table 5. Cell references should be substituted for the variable names which appear in the 
quasi-code. Although arranged horizontally in the calculations worksheet for the model, 
the variables are listed vertically here due to space consideration. In each of the 
calculations, “IF” statements were used because the salvo model equations allow for 
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negative numbers to result; this wouldn’t be appropriate for the graph generation. The 
“IF” statements ensure that all values are either zero or positive as appropriate.  
Table 5.   Quasi-Code for Calculations Used to Generate Graphs. 
Column Equation in Quasi-Code 
B Integers ranging from 1 to 40 
ΔA = IF ((β’ * B – a3’ * A) * a4 / a1 > 0, (β’ * B2 – a3’ * A) * a4 / a1, 0) 
Af = IF (A – ΔA > 0, A – ΔA > 0, 0) 
ΔB = IF ((α’ * A – b3’ * B) * b4 / b1 > 0, (α’ * A – b3’ * B) * b4 / b1, 0) 
Bf = IF (B – ΔB > 0, B – ΔB > 0, 0) 
FER = IF (ΔA / A = 0, #NULL!, ((ΔB / B) / (ΔA / A)) 
 The graph is an XY Scatter with data points connected by non-smoothed lines. 
Three series of data are plotted on the graph, all with variable B as the X variable (from 
the B column on the calculations worksheet). The first series is the A force remaining, 
using the Af column in the calculations worksheet. Throughout the study this data series 
was used to plot of the candidate vessels remaining as a function of the opponent force 
initial strength. The second series is the B force remaining, using the Bf column in the 
calculations worksheet. Throughout the study this data series was used to plot the 
opponent force remaining as a function of the opponent force initial strength. The third 
series is the Fractional Exchange Ratio, using the FER column in the calculations 
worksheet. Note that this data series requires the additional of a second Y-axis due to the 
wide variability in the values of FER. To maintain flexibility while exercising the model, 
leaving the range of the secondary Y-axis in automatic is strongly recommended. 
 The incorporation of leakers into the model required relatively minor changes. A 
leakage rate term (designated L) was added to the model worksheet with possible values 
ranging from zero to one. On the calculations worksheet, the ΔA term was modified by 
adding “ + B3*β*L / a1” to the quasi-code listed above in Table 5, and the ΔB term was 
modified likewise by adding “ + A3*α*L / b1” to the quasi-code listed above in Table 5. 
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The result is that when L has a value of zero, the graphical output appears exactly the 
same as before the leakage term was incorporated. Any value other than zero (only 
positive numbers between zero and one are permitted) degrades both forces according to 
the newly incorporated terms. 
 
Figure 18.   Screen Capture of the Model Worksheet with Sample Data 
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